The Possible Outcomes of the Iraqi Political Crisis

by Al-Jawhara bint Fahd bin Jughayman

Since the political blockage in Iraq nine months ago, Muqtada al-Sadr, head of the Sadrist movement, announced his retirement from his political career on Twitter, where he indicated that his work had threatened his life due to the violent response his movement’s supporters faced at Iraqi parliament following their protest at the capitol. The opposing crowd had escalated the clash and used live weapons to fuel greater political turmoil.

Could Iraq be on the verge of a disastrous (Shiite / Shiite) civil war?

Obviously, this question is bound to arise since the consequences of these political conflicts evolving into chaos on the Iraqi street could be devastating for the Iraqi people. What would be the impact of such a civil war and is there any chance the leadership of Iraqi sects can calm this situation before it escalates?

Without question, any chaos striking the political system will drastically alter all parties, either in a positive or negative manner. Is al-Sadr forced into this conflict and who could possibly benefit from this chaos?

In today’s Iraqi crisis, constant infighting plagues political parties despite the supposed unity of their sect. Rather than ideology being the focal point of the dispute, political authority has become the center of the issue.

Following American-occupied Iraq and the rise and fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, Iraq agreed to form a multi-religious, multi-ethnic government in which the success or independence of the nation cannot be compromised by external powers with their own interests or against the interests of the Iraqi people.

Three possibilities emerged during the political crisis: First, fragile stability may cause other detrimental effects on the economic and secure livelihood of the Iraqi people, eventually turning into a complete governmental and political collapse. Second, a lengthy sectarian war may follow suit with the crisis, starting out as a Shiite – Shiite dispute before branching out into other sects (i.e., Sunni, Arab, Kurd, etc.), dividing Iraq into warring states. Third, this crisis does have the possibility to end with the Sadrist movement’s return to dialogue, with a Sistani’s initiative to put a band aid on the crumbling rift in Iraq.

Internationally, leaders are calling for restraining a war at all costs, prioritizing the national interest of Iraqis over any sectarian political conflict. However, will the political parties respond, or will they continue their struggle for governmental control? Considering the exclusion of US military deterrence on the Iraqi arena following the withdrawal, will Iran allow this to happen loosely, or will it seek to interfere in a region it cannot afford to lose?

Edited/Translated by Husam Ramadan.