Bibi’s trip to D.C. did not pay off
Washington – WHIA Opinion
By Nashmi Arabi
Translation from Arabic by Dean Aesh
The state of Wisconsin in the north-central United States is renowned as the country’s leading cheese producer. Were it an independent nation, Wisconsin would rank as the world’s fourth-largest cheese producer—a fact that gives credence to the popular American jest: Lying in Washington is as common as cheese in Wisconsin.
This biting humor underscores the freedom of expression that Americans cherish and reflects a widespread belief that public political performances often do not align with the substantial policies typically discussed behind closed doors—far from cameras and applauding crowds.
Benjamin Netanyahu, who has studied, lived, and worked in the United States—and once held its citizenship—possesses perhaps a deeper understanding than most of the theatrical displays of Washington. He was the star of the latest spectacle during his reception at the U.S. Capitol, yet he was acutely aware that behind the grand display lay meetings of a very different nature.
When a friend of mine in the Middle East, keen on following American politics, sent me a message after watching Netanyahu’s reception at the Capitol, remarking, “This unprecedented welcome and applause signal the United States’ complete disregard for the Arab and Islamic worlds,” my response was: “It might be more accurate to say it reflects the immense power and influence of Israel specifically within Congress, and the United States’ historical and unequivocal bias towards Israel in general. However, it certainly does not reflect Washington’s firm and resolute stance against Netanyahu’s fervent desire to escalate his conflict in Gaza into a broader regional war—a conflict he sees as a lifeline from his many failures.”
The same Washington that gave Netanyahu a standing ovation in a grand orchestral display at the Capitol, and provided unwavering support for his unrestrained military operation in response to the events of October 7, is the very Washington that firmly opposed his fervent ambition to expand the conflict into a regional war. Washington sees no real benefit to Israel in such an escalation; at most, it might extend the tenure of Netanyahu’s government, which is plagued by a myriad of complex issues.
When President Biden boldly declared himself a Zionist, a shrewd reader like Netanyahu would immediately grasp that Biden’s message was: “I understand Israel’s interests better than you do, and I am more committed to them. I am not willing to sacrifice its security and well-being for a political lifeline for you—a lifeline that might not even serve its purpose.” This conclusion is one that a vast segment of Israelis themselves would agree with.
With precise calculation, Netanyahu chose this particular moment to visit Washington—one of the most politically polarized periods in recent American history. The polarization extends not only between Republicans and Democrats but even within the parties themselves. The administration, ostensibly in a “time-out” mode after the President’s withdrawal from seeking a second term, finds itself amidst a heated debate over the circumstances surrounding this withdrawal and the feverish preparations for the upcoming election. An election that promises to be decisive, not merely because it will determine the next president for the next four years but also because it will shape the balance of power between the two parties in both houses of Congress—the House of Representatives and the Senate. This balance will dictate the extent of influence each party holds in key committees such as Foreign Relations, Defense, Budget, and Intelligence over the next two years, and consequently, their ability to impact the policies of the new president, who the U.S. Constitution endows with the broadest powers in shaping foreign policy.
On the Republican side, Netanyahu hopes that Trump, who does not organically belong to this party, will be desperately in need of the support of influential Jewish lobbies to bolster Republican unity behind him. This is especially relevant given that a recent New York Times poll found that half of those who served in Trump’s previous administration do not support his bid for a second term. As for the Democrats, Kamala Harris’s need for this support is even more pressing, despite the widespread belief that she is the Democratic nominee for the presidential election. However, this will be officially decided at the Democratic National Convention scheduled for the 19th to the 22nd of this month in Chicago, where the party’s official presidential candidate will be selected.
To the astonishment of a well-informed observer of Washington’s current deep divisions, the unpleasant surprise awaiting Netanyahu—one that dispelled the euphoria of his legendary reception in Congress before his plane had even left Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland near Washington—came during his private meetings with both Donald Trump and Kamala Harris. Netanyahu was met with a language completely different from what he had hoped to hear, particularly at such a critical time for all three of them.
What Netanyahu heard from Trump and Harris is no secret in Washington. They both seriously urged him to take immediate practical steps to achieve tangible progress in his negotiations with Hamas, which began under significant American sponsorship in Doha, marked by the involvement of CIA Director William Burns, with the goal of ensuring Israeli security and the return of hostages in exchange for a swift end to Israel’s military operation, which had exceeded all boundaries. The most significant blow, however, was the insistence from both parties (each independently) that the two-state solution remains the only option on the table should either of them win.
Netanyahu and the extreme political right in Israel are acutely aware that revisiting the two-state solution would mark the end of Netanyahu’s political career—a prospect they had all been grateful to believe had been consigned to the past by the events of October 7, which they had always opposed.
Washington’s implicit rejection of Netanyahu’s desire to drag the region into a broader conflict was overshadowed by the overt extent of its support for Israel’s military operation. Yet despite this, Netanyahu has not spared any effort in undermining the Doha negotiations, even attempting to circumvent them by seeking to secure a Qatari-Hamas commitment to expel all Hamas leaders from Qatar—an agreement both sides reportedly consented to, possibly even beginning preparations for its implementation. However, the American position (according to highly credible leaks) surprised everyone by refusing the expulsion of Hamas from Qatar, apparently due to concerns that the group would relocate to Tehran, which had readily agreed to host Hamas leaders.
The U.S. refusal to allow Hamas’s expulsion from Qatar aligns perfectly with American political and intelligence strategies that prefer to keep their friends close—and their enemies closer—at least to ensure they remain within a sphere where the U.S. can manage them as circumstances dictate. At the same time, the U.S. is fully aware of the dangerous implications of Iran’s potential full absorption of Hamas, both politically and militarily, across the region—a reality that Netanyahu has chosen to completely disregard. In my view, two intertwined factors drive this decision: the first is Netanyahu’s belief that Hamas’s presence in Tehran would exacerbate the tension between Hamas and its surrounding Arab (and Sunni) environment, as well as the animosity between Iran and the same environment. As for the potential dangers this might pose to Israel and the region, it aligns perfectly with Netanyahu’s broader strategy, which many Israelis acknowledge revolves more around his personal and political ambitions than the security and safety of Israel.
Away from an overblown and ultimately worthless display in Tel Aviv, Netanyahu left Washington with little more than the bitter disappointment of what he heard from Biden, Harris, and Trump. He departed determined to do everything in his power to create a new reality in the region that would make it difficult for his American ally to maintain its anti-escalation stance. If all his efforts with allies have failed in this regard, why not try the other side—specifically Iran—pushing it into a corner that forces Tehran to drive the escalation, either directly or through its regional proxies? This comes after Tehran has shown exceptional restraint and demonstrated to Washington that it is an adversary capable of calculated and disciplined behavior.
Netanyahu clearly recognized that this time he needed a different, significant event—something that would be nearly impossible for Iran to ignore without a substantial response that might succeed in pushing the region back to the brink and force his stubborn American ally into a dramatic shift in its stance. In this context, Netanyahu made the decision to assassinate “Shukr” in Beirut and “Haniyeh” in Tehran.
It was only natural that the timing and scope of the operation raised questions from a seasoned Israeli journalist like Alon Pinkas, who served as an international relations adviser to two Israeli Prime Ministers and two Foreign Ministers, and as Israel’s Consul General in New York. In his article in the Israeli newspaper Haaretz last Thursday, Pinkas asks bluntly:
“One has to wonder why Netanyahu chose now to assassinate Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, in the midst of sensitive hostage negotiations?”
The answer came in an article by Thomas Friedman in The New York Times on the same day:
“Was it simply because it was possible and Haniyeh’s hands are stained with much Israeli blood? Or is Israel deliberately provoking escalation, hoping that a conflict with Iran would draw the United States into it? This would distance Prime Minister Netanyahu from the responsibility for the disaster of October 7, for which he has not been held accountable to this day!”
The pivotal question now is: Will Netanyahu’s plan succeed in pushing Iran to abandon its disciplined approach in managing a real conflict, where thus far it has managed to match its American adversary in precisely maintaining its boundaries? Or is the region truly on the brink of a confrontation that Netanyahu desperately needs? In this light, is the movement of U.S. naval forces in the region part of preparations for a confrontation—or an attempt to impose limits and controls on it?
Whatever the coming days (or perhaps hours) may bring, one truth is clear to Washington: with friends like Netanyahu, there is no need to seek out enemies. Perhaps this is the same truth that Iran’s “allies” in the region must also come to realize.