In the last few months, several articles were published promoting the idea that the civil war in Syria had practically ended. However, for so many reasons, including humanitarian incentives, it is necessary to rehabilitate the regime in Damascus.
Nothing could be worse for the interest of the Syrian people than such an argument. Yet, I pretend it will perpetuate the civil war, further foster the disintegration of the state and the nation and initiate a new cycle of an endless civil war.
My argument is based on the following:
In principle, no totalitarian regime can survive on oppression alone—regardless of how harshly the heavy hand of government wields its limited power. Such dictatorships ultimately prove unable to sustain even a relative societal peace unless they accept that they must learn to balance four main elements or:
Ideological legitimacy basis: Totalitarian regimes need a deep well of stories that further their legitimate power by routinely reminding the citizenry of their revolutionary mission.
Financial resources: Monetary allocation and reallocation based on rentier revenue capable of maintaining—but not upsetting—the socio-economic status quo.
The core bond: A hierarchy built upon crony state capitalism and based on a distinct sectoral division of responsibilities and benefits.
The social contract: As the name implies, an unspoken agreement between parties to the conflict.
To substantiate these factors in the face of the Syrian experience, I will try—very briefly—to apply each to a specific element within the ongoing crisis.
Some specific examples to make my argument more concrete are as follows
Ideological legitimacy basis:
The ideological legitimacy of the regime was always the primary concern for Hafez al-Assad. On one occasion in 1988, he asked his close entourage, “The Russians are heading to the west; how could we?” He explained what he meant by this in a lengthy discussion, then insisted that the Soviet Union was nearing its final collapse. He then expressed concern that his own me could very well be heading for the same fate—a sort of “Syrian edition” of the Socialist model. The question then became how to stave off this fate.
This reflective period coincided with several strategic projects that ultimately ushered in the supranational Pan-Arabism ideology. Viz., the fading anti-Israeli narrative undermined the regime’s credibility given that there no longer appeared to be a viable solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict—be it through war or peace—upon which to sustain the people’s belief in the Assad government.
Hafez Al-Assad feeling that he needed to re-orient, or readapt, his regime to the shifting global environment, was his primary reason for sending troops to Hafr Al-Batin (Arabic: حفر الباطن) in Saudi Arabia in 1991 to do battle against Saddam Hussein. As a Pan-Arab leader, this could have been seen as political suicide.
Only later, and after the fall of Baghdad and well into the Bashar era, this would become Assad’s modus operandi. In other words, whenever the regime felt squeezed at the international level—and especially after the fall of Baghdad–the palace agitated for more direct tactical diplomacy to activate the peace process through different lines either with Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States (U.S.), among others. Of course, the incentive for those moves was always to appease external pressures. But, and on more than one occasion, once negotiations reached a critical, decisive moment, Bashar stepped back.
On one such occasion, after having reached an advanced point in the indirect negotiations with Israel through the Turkish mediation process, Bashar instructed his diplomatic team that he did not intend to follow through with a peace agreement. Instead, he explicitly expressed that at the end of the day, he did not want the negotiating to work on a peace agreement but rather on the end of the state of war. His argument in the meeting was that public opinion was not yet ready. However, he added further that it was impossible to reduce his populace’s willingness to prepare ahead of a possible Israeli attack. Then, it became evident that he was concerned that full-scale peace would deprive his totalitarian regime of a lasting ideological legitimizing story.
Financial resources:
Despite the relative scarcity of natural resources in Syria, the regime has enjoyed a near-constant flow of rent income. Not only this crony-state capitalist model has supported the purchase of arms over the decades, but It also guaranteed a social safety net for the regime’s elite. It was repeatedly said in the circles of the internal bureaucracy of the regime that “The best good Syria is exporting is its regional role in the exchange of money.”
The inevitable deterioration, corruption, and degradation of the public sector manifested in ineffective manufacturing practices, the destruction of an intellectual elite, and a failed education system. Each of these seemingly important aspects of society was sacrificed to ensure the uninterrupted flow of rents to supporters of the regime.
Reviewing the Syrian budget from those years reveals how the regime survived, managed a complex system to tamed social contradictions through rent money from the Gulf states. That kept flowing after each crisis. The role of the rent money was undeniable in the intervening years of 1967, 1976, 1982, and 1991 and the Saddam Hussein era. The regime was also well funded following the reconciliation between Bashar al-Assad and Saad al-Hariri—long before Lebanon ceded to Hezbollah in 2008.
The core bond:
Contrary to some notions presented in the book, the ties that bound the people to the regime were far more complex than relying on the sectarian bond or preserving its interests. The Alawite loyalty system community was only one element in securing the social basis of the regime. It was only reduced to this one sectarian dimension a few months after the explosive Syrian uprising. Once it became clear that the regime was failing t,o reconcile the many contradictions within its vast socio-economic contract system.
Following his arrival to power, Hafez al-Assad has since rebuilt the system, aiming to achieve a sort of power balance within the social basis of his regime.
While Hafez was the sole persona in everything related to the regional and international alliances, he delegated considerable wealth and corruption to a band of nine individuals led by Abdel-Halim Khadam, otherwise known as the “Uncles” of Bashar. Less than half of them were Alawites. This junta has since taken over the running of the well-known “chocolate fountain” machine responsible for distributing wealth across the political and socio-economic spectrum.
This sectoral partition parceled the domestic domains in a feudal-like manner among the various “Uncles.”
A particular flow of rent was also cultivated among the various allied mirror interests and the ruling elite of Lebanon—including the mighty dominion of Rafiq al-Hariri.
When Bashar ascended to power in June 2000, his “Uncles'” bond was already grasping at the critical networks of rent and the loyalty system within the Syrian state bureaucracy and aiming at the elite from within the army and security services.
This core bond could sabotage and humiliate Bashar al-Assad’s attempt to prove his power on many occasions. As a result, Bashar attempted to shake and undermine this relationship by inciting the “Damascus Spring.” However, the bond soon forced him to capitulate to Abdel Halim Khadam and other “Uncles.” His counterattack included an anti-corruption campaign, which ultimately backfired on him and his supporters.
He finally managed to regain the upper hand after the assassination of al-Hariri. Subsequently, he destroyed a significant source of rent that formed the foundation of the bonded “Uncles” revenue stream.
His victory was made manifest in the Tenth Congress of the Ba’ath party, which allowed him to purge his “Uncles” out.
Unfortunately, after his success, he revoked any anti-corruption or reform initiative. It soon became evident that Bashar just used the reform pretext as a tool against his “Uncles” without any intent to export it to other failing sectors within his regime.
After the assassination of al-Hariri, he became increasingly entangled in Iran. The only viable alternative, then, became seeking redress with the help of Turkey.
In this respect, we can conclude that while Hafez al-Assad was not directly involved in the tremendously corrupt economic system, he used it to buy loyalty. At the same time, and after his ascent to power, Bashar became a crucial player in perpetuating corrupt practices.
The social contract:
After getting rid of the party’s leftist wing in 1970, the social contract was redesigned by Hafez al-Assad based on a customized distribution of labor across the regime.
He enjoyed financial support from the Gulf States after assuming power—mainly because he was seen as a master alliance builder, which spurred him to create more partnerships to secure his newfound domestic arena. He assigned the Ba’ath party the role of managing the relationship with the peasantry, the working classes, and the rural and urban petite bourgeoisie.
However, this restricted social contract did not last long as this was manifest following the Moslem Brotherhood insurrection of 1979 to 1982. Hafez al-Assad quickly learned the hard way; he can no longer ignore four other components of the Syrian society. He tasked the security services with rebuilding and managing the state’s many corrupt administrative divisions.
The four socio-economic strata were:
- The business society
- The Kurds
- The Islamists
- Tribes
By consolidating the “bond” and the “social contract” systems of the regime and across society, Hafez al-Assad secured the smooth flow of “the chocolate fountain”—which was a common phrase oft-heard among the Syrian elite.
Social basis during Bashar’s era:
In contrast to his father’s canny alliance-building, Bashar al-Assad carelessly dismantled and destroyed every element of this regime. Furthermore, he proved incapable of generating new sources of power. A brief review shows how Bashar killed off every one of the elements mentioned above, or:
First, the erosion of the sources of revolutionary legitimacy:
Under Bashar’s oversight, each of the narratives formerly propped up the regime’s legitimacy slowly disintegrated. Again, this deterioration is evidenced by the failed pan-Arabism project and the loss of momentum around sustaining the Arab-Israeli conflict. This ideological vacuum was made deepened, still, as calls for social justice went unanswered. Many close advisors to Bashar al-Assad encouraged him to prioritize governance, development, and participation to stave off threats to his credibility.
Bashar persisted, of course, and even went so far as to push a renewed—though pretentious—anti-Israeli line of rhetoric. For example, after the 2008 Gaza War, he accused the Gulf States of being “half men” because of their moderate position regarding this conflict. In so doing, however, he ultimately cut his line of funding—severing his main revenue stream.
To summarize, we must conclude—the book’s authors included—that the collapse of the leftist-Soviet model and the disintegration of the Pan-Arabic dream coupled with the apparent deadlock in the ostentatious “liberation of Palestine” all combined to undermine the regime’s ideological raison d’etre. Thus, it must be inferred—and accepted—that the Ba’ath party is unrevivable.
Second, the decline of rent:
The decline of rent is a sweeping phenomenon across the entire Middle East; its repercussions, however, were hardest felt in those countries where there had been a more profound encroachment of the crony, rent-based economy and where the so-called “rent based business society” was prevailing at the expense of the product and services business economy. As a result, business society was ultimately gradually devastated.
From 2004 through 2009, there still had been some hope toward resetting the various means of production across the Syrian state, but which were ultimately dashed due to two conflicting politico-economic models.
The first—a so-called parasitic “rent-based business model—included many businesses within the private sector. Unfortunately, this model relied upon bribes and other forms of corruption to fund its activities and was trapped in several different unscrupulous centers of power supported by Iran.
Historically, on the other hand, and dating back to the 1990s, a productive private business society grew through a trade-and-barter system with Russia. This barter system led to a flourishing industrial and mercantile business society, especially in Aleppo, which led to renewed calls to partner with Turkey. Bashar al-Assad, however, failed to seize the moment to liberalize his country. Instead, he simply doubled down his dependence on Iran.
The historical meaning of the Arab Spring is also at the heart of the failed crony state in Syria. Yet, in retrospect, the profound changes in the geo-economic dynamics across the region suggested that new trends would be accelerating toward ending such pseudo-capitalist state models.
Such underlying trends are not expected to return anytime soon, given Bashar’s unwillingness to form new socio-economic alliances. Unlike his son, Hafez was concerned with managing the unavoidable collapse of the state’s model. Bashar, however, seems content to rebuild it.
Third, the disintegration of the regime core:
Bashar al-Assad simply confiscated the “chocolate fountain” in an attempt to strengthen the bureaucratic and elite basis of power for his regime and, in so doing, turn it into an increasingly narrow sectarian structure. Then, after the Tenth Congress of the Party, he demolished the system—effectively dismantling the apparatus. Since this turn of events—nor before 2010—has he succeeded in building back up an alliance to redistribute wealth or create new power structures. On the contrary, this regime vacuum has since been replaced by opposing factions and heavily divided and competing warlords.
Fourth, the business:
The social contract of the regime used to be described as an alliance between Damascene merchants and Alawi officers—is no more a functional social contract. The current situation has all but forced Damascene businesses to flee the country due to increasingly low rents, the total lack of personal and economic security, the collapse of the pound, and the aggressive tax system, which, of course, features numerous mafiosos and warlords demanding bribes and other “fees.”
The Tribes/prominent families:
Even though the book mentioned the tribal component as an essential part of the Syrian people’s identity, the importance of the tribes as a considerable socio-economic component is exaggerated. In truth, we need to notice the severe deterioration of the economic basis of the tribes, which has quasi-totally collapsed and generated a new economy based on the role of prominent urbanized big families—not the traditional tribes.
Hafez al-Assad assigned to those prominent families and tasked them with handling regional smuggling networks—this was a robust line of profit flowing from Turkey, the Gulf States, and Israel. In exchange, Hafez al-Assad secured what was long seen as his undefendable borders with Turkey, Iraq, and Jordan. Manipulating these prominent families became vital for the regime, especially during the Muslim Brotherhood insurrection and following the many PKK skirmishes on Turkey’s borders.
Instead of managing these complex relationships, however, Bashar partnered with his cousin Rami Makhlouf to—short-sightedly—confiscate all the smuggling trade within this region, carelessly assigning himself direct hegemony over this region-wide smuggling network. This move deprived the “big families” of tens of millions of dollars of income each month. Moreover, it led—both directly and indirectly—to raise social anger and participated in the explosion of the Syrian uprising. No wonder then it erupted so fiercely in the smuggling towns and cities. Would it be Dara’a or Tal-Kalakh, al-Baida or Azaz, Tal-Abiad, or all other border cities and towns?
Furthermore, the reconciliation effort between the regime and the remnants of those tribal families in Dara’a is inaccurate. The Russians, who mediated over 500 local reconciliation deals, agree that this operation was largely superficial and succeeded as a means in which to secure agreements temporarily. Over the long-term, however, these deals largely failed and have since seen the exact regime revenge on defectors who were party to those earlier deals. At present, we can count more than 250 targeted killings of those participants and leaders involved in the Russian reconciliation process. Despite all this, the regime is still not ready to make efforts toward a renewed reconciliation process despite ongoing efforts by the Russians.
The Kurds:
Despite all the incentives presented by the Russians to walk midway towards the regime, the Syrian regime has failed to deliver. Viz., the Kurds most recently prohibited participation of the entire Eastern Euphrates during the presidential election.
To summarize my argument, it becomes clear that predicting the end of the civil war in Syria and the rebuilding of the nation-state was not based on reality. Advancing the adoption of Bashar’s victory in this region is blatantly ignoring this still status-quo, which, at best, would mean nothing more than a miserable Pyrrhic victory.
The regime’s capability in returning to this model—even with some modifications—is simply impossible. Sustainable dictatorships built on oppression demand military-like victories and propaganda to ensure their legitimate claims to power—as presented above.
As regards the Syrian crisis, The Orien Research Center—just as an example—has produced many case studies, including:
The demographic shifts in Syria prove that in addition to the repercussions likely to come out of the ongoing “Sunni Question,” we must also shed additional light on the demographic catastrophes affecting similar minorities, especially the Alawites. According to our field research, we can conclude that, demographically, the Alawites are unlikely to regain their previous status nor provide their army with the necessary human capital necessary to continue waging various campaigns.
In terms of the economy, the main threat is the cost of war and the fact that more than 70% of the primary sources of Syrian exports and hard currency remain out of reach for the regime. Further, the peripheral regions are getting economically—and entirely—annexed by neighboring economies with shifts away from Damascus in favor of Lebanon. This confirms that Aleppo is a dying city as it continues to suffer under the deprivations forced upon it by Turkey, the Euphrates, Iraq, and Latakia.
According to still more case studies and field reports, the ongoing civil war fragmented the economy into small domains of production and distribution that barely exceed 70 kilometers in diameter. As a result, the Syrian economy was abruptly returned to a primitive status not since witnessed since the fall of the Ottoman Empire.
The notion of the possibility of rebuilding the system while maintaining its core structure is a non-starter. The economy of war—replete with warlords looting the scare revenues from small product- and service-based manufacturers—is the epitome of cannibalization in a region already struggling to survive merely.
Lastly, further research on the life cycle of the Syrian civil war is needed. Daesh is regaining ground, which should raise more questions about the future of the status quo; it elucidates how refractory the whole situation is, including the shifting balance of power between different regional intruders. In the last year alone, the Turkish troops taught us a lesson when they managed—in three episodes—to crush the allied Russian, Iranian, and regime forces.
