Quiet mediation efforts between Egypt and Iran have been going on for months, seeking to end one of the Middle East’s longest-running but often-neglected feuds. In May, credible media reports indicated that Egyptian-Iranian talks had been taking place in Baghdad since March. Later that month, Oman’s Sultan Haitham bin Tariq visited both Cairo and Tehran in what was interpreted as an attempt to broker a reconciliation.

Several Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Ebrahim Raisi, have publicly endorsed these efforts. And an Iranian member of parliament said he expected the talks to culminate in the restoration of formal ties and pave the way for a meeting between the two countries’ presidents. For their part, however, Egyptian officials have maintained a cautious stance on the issue, with Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry saying that the status quo with Iran has not changed.

Relations between Egypt and Iran have been strained for more than four decades, though tensions have been punctuated by periods of calm. The strains can be attributed in part to the dramatic events of the late 1970s and early 1980s, when Egypt gave refuge to Iranian Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi after his ouster by the Islamic Revolution in 1979. The Shah lived in Cairo until his death in 1980, after which he was buried there. In a sign of protest, Iran’s new rulers cut ties with Egypt. Later, when an Islamist military officer assassinated then-Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat in 1981, authorities in Tehran named a main thoroughfare in the city after him. The bitterness engendered on both sides went on to poison bilateral relations for some time.

In addition to these symbolic slights, a number of strategic considerations sustained the rift. After a decade of revolutionary fervor in Iran created antagonistic relations with almost all its neighbors, Tehran sought to put an end to its regional isolation. But Egypt, which as a major U.S. ally in the Middle East receives some $2 billion in security and economic assistance from Washington every year, felt no urge to mend its ties with a country whose leaders made a habit of describing the U.S. as “the great Satan.” By the 1980s and 1990s, Egypt had also developed close political and economic linkages with the Arab Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, which viewed Iran as a security threat.

Longtime Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, who ruled from 1981 to 2011, calculated that cozying up to Iran could jeopardize his country’s strategic alliance with the U.S. and the West in general, as well as with the Gulf states. Moreover, facing a fierce Islamist opposition, he felt uneasy about Iran’s promotion of a transnational form of Islamist activism and suspected that Tehran aimed to cultivate relations with Egyptian Islamist groups. After Mubarak was ousted in 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated President Mohamed Morsi sought to reset ties, visiting Tehran in 2012 and receiving Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Cairo the following year. But the short-lived thaw ended after the rise to power of incumbent President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi in 2013.

However, a new situation has emerged in the Middle East in recent years, due to the perception that the U.S. is gradually retreating from the region. As Washington has reduced its commitments and shifted its gaze to the Indo-Pacific, regional powers have responded by diversifying their international partnerships and bolstering their ties with Russia and China in particular. They have also become less willing to heed U.S. demands. In March, a historic normalization deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran was brokered by China. In May, Syria was readmitted to the Arab League after an 11-year suspension, despite Washington’s public criticism of the move. In this context, the Egyptian-Iranian dialogue is part of wider regional reconciliation efforts over which the U.S. has little control.

There is little doubt that Iran approaches the talks with Egypt with an eye on mitigating its relative isolation in the Arab world and undermining U.S. and Israeli efforts to form an anti-Iran Arab front. Indeed, as the Arab world’s most-populous country, Egypt is the last remaining major Arab state not to have at least begun to mend its fences with Iran. Egypt’s motivations are less evident. Surrounded by several potentially contagious hot spots in Libya, Sudan and Gaza, Cairo has a vested interest in promoting engagement and moderation across the region. After nearly a decade of animosity, for instance, Egypt recently patched up its relations with Qatar and narrowed its differences with Turkey.

The dialogue with Tehran can be seen through this prism. Cairo is aware of Iran’s influence over Hamas and other Gaza-based Palestinian factions. From its perspective, an understanding with Iran could be harnessed to moderate the behavior of these militant groups.

But there is probably more to it than that. Egypt is in the throes of a severe economic crisis that has cut the value of its currency in half and disrupted trade flows. Facing an acute foreign currency shortage, it has sought different forms of financial assistance from international financial institutions, wealthy oil-rich Gulf states and even countries like India and war-torn Libya.

Iran, which faces its own economic challenges due to the impact of U.S. sanctions, has little to offer in the form of direct aid. But thawed relations could be a boon to Egypt’s tourism sector. Home to dozens of Shiite holy sites, mosques and shrines, Egypt could attract large numbers of Iranian visitors—who have been barred from entering the country for decades—if relations are normalized. That could provide a critical contribution to its cash-strapped economy. Indeed, a step in this direction was already taken in March, when Egyptian authorities relaxed visa regulations to allow Iranians traveling in groups to southern Sinai to obtain visas on arrival. A rapprochement could also enhance economic cooperation, including in the vital oil sector.

That said, the restoration of Egyptian-Iranian ties is not a foregone conclusion, as Egypt is currently treading carefully on this path. Its influential security agencies vetoed similar moves in the past, despite the inclination of the country’s senior diplomats to consider conciliatory options. Additionally, Egypt is keen not to provoke its Gulf patrons, who have historically looked askance at an Egyptian-Iranian rapprochement, fearing it would upset the delicate balance of power in the Gulf. Now that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are also pursuing détente with Iran, they might lift their objections to Cairo following suit.

If successful, however, the normalization of ties between Egypt and Iran would once again expose Washington’s diminishing role in influencing regional dynamics. As the Pax Americana has eroded in the Middle East over the past decade, local actors have increasingly shaped the contours of regional politics, often in cooperation with China and Russia. But by far the biggest loser of such an outcome would be Israel, which feels threatened by Iran’s nuclear program and considers Tehran and its proxies to be evil forces with which there can be no compromise. The reintegration of Iran and Syria into the regional community would only exacerbate Israel’s security concerns.

The recent wave of reconciliation deals in the Middle East could help deescalate tensions in the region. But for how long? Conflict is endemic among its states, and periods of peace often turn out to be transient. But if Egypt and Iran do manage to normalize their relations, it would at least be a step toward finding out the answer to that question.

Nael Shama is a political scholar and writer who focuses on Middle East politics. He is the author of “Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi,” and his work has appeared in International Affairs, the Middle East Journal, Mediterranean Politics, Le Monde Diplomatique, Reuters Opinion and Foreign Policy, among others.

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