{"id":4688,"date":"2022-06-25T09:35:31","date_gmt":"2022-06-25T14:35:31","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/whia.us\/4688\/"},"modified":"2022-06-30T07:00:28","modified_gmt":"2022-06-30T12:00:28","slug":"%d9%85%d8%a7%d8%b0%d8%a7-%d9%8a%d8%b9%d9%86%d9%8a-%d8%aa%d8%b4%d9%83%d9%8a%d9%84-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a5%d8%b7%d8%a7%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d9%86%d8%b3%d9%8a%d9%82%d9%8a-%d8%ad%d9%83%d9%88%d9%85","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/whia.us\/en\/4688\/","title":{"rendered":"A “framework” government with an Iranian character\u00a0\u00a0"},"content":{"rendered":"

Report: Reham Al-Hakim<\/strong><\/p>\n

On Thursday, June 23, the Iraqi Council of Representatives held an extraordinary session in the presence of 202 deputies and voted on the Sadrist bloc’s replacements, who withdrew at the request of the leader of the Sadrist movement Muqtada al-Sadr.<\/span><\/p>\n

Sixty-four deputies out of 73 substitutes took the constitutional oath to occupy the Parliament. Nine new deputies failed to attend the session, five of whom were from the Sadrist bloc, for their refusal to join Parliament and their demand to replace other members of the losing candidates.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The session also included a vote by members of the House of Representatives to amend its internal system and to cancel the phrase “presidency,” which is one of the differences between Parliament Speaker Muhammad al-Halbousi, and his resigned deputy, Hakim al-Zamili, who is affiliated with the Sadrist bloc.<\/span><\/p>\n

With the rise of the substitutes, the “Coordination Framework,” which consists of Shiite parties loyal to Iran, has captured 40 of the Sadrist movement’s seats, based on the figures issued by the Electoral Commission, where the number of “Coordination” deputies increased to about 130, making it the most prominent force. Within the House of Representatives, it allows him to choose the prime minister and form the disputed government since the October 2021 elections.<\/span><\/p>\n

Hours before the session was scheduled to take place, the leader of the Sadrist movement, Muqtada al-Sadr, spoke with a firm tone, promising the “coordinating framework.” Referring to them in his speech with the phrase “the arms of Iran.” calling on his allies – the Kurds and Sunnis – in Parliament to take a brave stand for reform, save The homeland, and not keep pace with their sectarian pressures – regarding the deputies of the “coordinating framework” – and described the step as “a stage without corrupt people.”<\/span><\/p>\n

A “framework” government with an Iranian character\u00a0\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

The “coordinating framework” includes several traditional Shiite parties that have ruled Iraq since 2005, including the “State of Law Coalition” led by former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, the “Wisdom” movement led by Ammar al-Hakim, and Haider al-Abadi, the former prime minister. In addition to a group of armed factions affiliated with the “Popular Mobilization” institution, including “Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq,” “Hezbollah Brigades,” and “Al-Nujaba.” Those armed factions successfully tightened their grip on the provinces of the center and south, which are densely Shiite.<\/span><\/p>\n

Most of these groups are ideologically loyal to the Supreme Leader of the Iranian Republic, Ali Khamenei. These factions declare that they are part of the global Iranian Islamic revolution, carry a project beyond the borders of Iraq, and present themselves as part of what is known as the “axis of resistance” backed by Iran.<\/span><\/p>\n

After 18 years of Iranian dominance over Iraq, the Iranian role in Iraq began to decline after the October 2019 protests, called the “October Intifada,” which condemned Iranian interventions in Iraq. That uprising caused the overthrow of Adel Abdul-Mahdi’s government and the formation of Mustafa Al-Kazemi’s government in May 2020.<\/span><\/p>\n

Since the fall of the Baathist regime in 2003, Iraq has become accustomed to foreign interference by its neighbors, especially Iran. Geographical proximity and sectarian harmony between the Iraqi and Iranian people. Mutual influences exercised by religious institutions and the association of party groups with Iran are in the interest of the neighboring countries. As it made Iraq a platform from which the Iranian Republic benefited from its regional expansion project and regional competitions.<\/span><\/p>\n

The resignation of the Sadrist movement’s deputies from Parliament did not benefit the Change and Reform camp, but it did benefit the “coordinating framework” parties \u2013 or what is known as the “traditional parties” \u2013 that follow Iran.<\/span><\/p>\n

Over the course of eighteen years, the traditional parties sought to take advantage of the loose grip state after the fall of the Baathist regime and control institutions. They worked to build their own space of political, economic, and military power.<\/span><\/p>\n

The popularity of these parties declined among the Shiite population of the central and southern Provinces, and widespread anger against them and Iran escalated, leading to a clash between the parties of Iran and the society of the south, which was evident in the “October protests.”<\/span><\/p>\n

The events of 2019 continue to cast a shadow over the country’s political scene.<\/span><\/p>\n

Writer and political analyst Ali Al-Baydar considered that “the task of forming a government, whose movement is currently led by the coordination framework, will be easier at the local level. because he wants a consensual government that brings together all parties, with no harsh conditions in place, the framework will likely respond to the conditions that The forces allied to al-Sadr (the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Sunni Sovereignty Alliance) will put in place.”<\/span><\/p>\n

However, Al-Baydar did not rule out the interference of the Iranian decision and its authority over the next government that will be formed by the “framework.” consisting of armed political parties that will be part of that government.<\/span><\/p>\n

He believes that “it is unlikely that Nuri al-Maliki will be a candidate for prime minister because he may be inclined to exalt his status as the head of the executive authority. He is currently living in a state of political mysticism to present himself as a leader greater than the position of the prime minister, who will be a tool for the various political parties.”<\/span><\/p>\n

According to the Iraqi analyst, it is likely that al-Maliki will push for a close alternative figure to him so that the decisions of that personality fit with al-Maliki’s positions, and the next prime minister may be a front for al-Maliki.<\/span><\/p>\n

As for the Sunni and Kurdish blocs, Al-Baydar said, during his interview with “White House in Arabic,” that “the position of these forces is not unified. There are Sunni politicians close to Iran, Such as the Azm Alliance. Others are allies of Sadr, such as the Alliance of Sovereignty, and there are Kurds close to Iran, Such as “the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and others close to al-Sadr, the Kurdistan Democratic Party.”<\/span><\/p>\n

Al-Baydar believes that “Al-Sadr’s Sunni and Kurdish allies will not choose the opposition side. They will have to participate in the new government that the coordination framework will form to ensure some gains for the Sunni and Kurdish components and so that there is no replacement for them with figures from the “Azm” and “Al-Yakti” alliance close to Tehran.”<\/span><\/p>\n

Al-Baydar expected that the government would not be more than a year old due to the general congestion of the street and its resentment over the living conditions.<\/span><\/p>\n

This prevalent congestion is contrasted with the efforts of the “October” parties that resulted from the protests. Returning to the demonstration and their refusal to participate in the political process in its current state increases the chances of resorting to the street in a new national act and more reformist positions, which means that Iraq may witness demonstrations And protests on a larger scale that may reach new cities.<\/span><\/p>\n

In addition to the “Tishreen” parties and movements, al-Sadr’s exit from the parliament door – in Al-Baydar’s opinion – does not mean his exit from the political process. He may return to it from the window of the protests, or be an essential part of the project of the upcoming protests, with greater intensity and more organization, which will lead to Removing the government, whether it is near or far from Tehran.<\/span><\/p>\n

Why did the project of the cross-component Sadrist alliance fail?<\/strong><\/p>\n

In a speech on May 16, the visibly frustrated Sadr pledged not to cut a deal with his Shiite rivals. He was hinting at the capabilities of the Saraya al-Salam militia that recently opened doors to recruits in Babil and Diyala provinces.<\/span><\/p>\n

Iran’s attempts to mend the Shiite divide between the Tire and the Tayyar parties have failed. A role for which the Iranian general, Qassem Soleimani, who was killed in a US drone strike in January 2020, was responsible.<\/span><\/p>\n

Al-Sadr, who won the largest number of seats in the elections, could not muster a sufficient number to pass his project to form a “national majority” government.<\/span><\/p>\n

This failure is explained by Dr. Iyad al-Anbar, a professor of political science at the University of Kufa in Najaf, with “the decision of the Federal Court that stipulated a quorum in electing the president of the republic by a two-thirds majority.”<\/span><\/p>\n

The other side, according to Al-Anbar, is “the presence of wills that pressured the anti-Sadr political forces to remain committed to their alliance within the coordination framework, in addition to the splits within the Sunni alliance (Azm), and they are joining the forces of the coordination framework.” These factors made passing the presidential candidate very difficult for the majority coalition. Amber says.<\/span><\/p>\n

According to the Iraqi academic, during his speech to “White Mortar in Arabic,” “the issue of forming the government by a majority of 165 votes is now related primarily to agreements that can contribute to the election of the President of the Republic, and then assigning the Prime Minister \u2026 these understandings so far are not clear. how can the Kurdish and Sunni parties be dealt with, and other issues related to agreeing on the name of the President of the Republic, and then talking about the other plan.”<\/span><\/p>\n

About the form of that government, Amber asserts, “In general, Iraq will not testify with an explicit title, that it is (pro-Iranian and anti-American). in addition to that, Iran may not take the risk of adopting a government, and will not be responsible for forming a government.”<\/span><\/p>\n

Al-Amber believes that “the sensitive timing now lies in the ability of the next government to convince Iraqi citizens of the current service situation, in light of the high rate of discontent in the central and southern Provinces in conjunction with the presence of financial abundance.”<\/span><\/p>\n

In the midst of these controversies and political conflict, anticipation in Iraq is still the master of the situation, despite the clarity of the map of balance and the holders of power. Al-Sadr is waiting for the framework government, and widespread disgust with Tehran’s allies may completely reverse the political equation, which indicates the emergence of protests stronger than its counterpart In 2019. However, this time the demonstrators may not accept early elections, but the ceiling of demands may affect the nature of the political system and the form of government in the country.<\/span><\/p>\n

Translated\/Edited by:
\n<\/span>Abdelrahman El-Naggar
\n<\/em>\u00a0Intern with\u00a0WHiA<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In the midst of these controversies and political conflict, anticipation in Iraq is still the master of the situation, despite the clarity of the map of balance<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":4591,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"episode_type":"","audio_file":"","podmotor_file_id":"","podmotor_episode_id":"","cover_image":"","cover_image_id":"","duration":"","filesize":"","filesize_raw":"","date_recorded":"","explicit":"","block":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[498,134,142,128,129],"tags":[502,147,151,503,499,500,501],"series":[1027],"coauthors":[238],"class_list":{"0":"post-4688","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","6":"hentry","7":"category-bawabet-aliraq-en","8":"category-democracies-en","9":"category-most-important-topics-en","10":"category-updates-en","11":"category-usa-world-en","12":"tag-framework-government","13":"tag-iran-en","14":"tag-iraq-en","15":"tag-sadrs-bloc","16":"tag---en","19":"series-whia-synergy"},"episode_featured_image":"https:\/\/whia.us\/wp-content\/uploads\/\u062c\u0632\u064a-e1656167690446.jpg","episode_player_image":"https:\/\/whia.us\/wp-content\/plugins\/seriously-simple-podcasting\/assets\/images\/no-album-art.png","download_link":"","player_link":"","audio_player":false,"episode_data":{"playerMode":"dark","subscribeUrls":{"apple_podcasts":{"key":"apple_podcasts","url":"","label":"Apple Podcasts","class":"apple_podcasts","icon":"apple-podcasts.png"},"stitcher":{"key":"stitcher","url":"","label":"Stitcher","class":"stitcher","icon":"stitcher.png"},"google_podcasts":{"key":"google_podcasts","url":"","label":"Google Podcasts","class":"google_podcasts","icon":"google-podcasts.png"},"spotify":{"key":"spotify","url":"","label":"Spotify","class":"spotify","icon":"spotify.png"}},"rssFeedUrl":"https:\/\/whia.us\/en\/feed\/podcast\/whia-synergy","embedCode":"

A “framework” government with an Iranian character\u00a0\u00a0<\/a><\/blockquote>